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• Innovations in communications and information
technology and the related globalization of
financial markets are increasing the level of
competition faced by Canada’s established equity
markets. Traditional stock exchanges are increasingly
able to compete in each other’s markets, and
advances in technology have reduced barriers to
entry,attractingnewcompetitorssuchasAlternative
Trading Systems (ATSS) to the market.
• Traditional Canadian stock exchanges have
reacted to these competitive challenges in a
number of ways. One major change was the recent
restructuring of the principal Canadian exchanges.
In addition, exchanges have changed their owner-
ship structures, formed alliances, introduced new
products or features, and improved their market
quality through the introduction of new
technology.
• Equity markets have had a long history of
fragmentation (securities trading takes place
in multiple markets, and there is no opportunity for
orders to interact). Securities regulators have
identiﬁed market fragmentation as a potential
concern with respect to ATSs. This concern must
be weighed against the possible benefits that
competition and innovation can bring to
Canadian markets. The Canadian Securities
Administrators have proposed a framework that
attempts to address this problem and that would
allow ATSs to compete with the traditional
exchanges for the ﬁrst time.
here has been a dramatic surge of interest in,
and activity on, global equity markets in
recent years. In Canada, the number of
shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE) has doubled in the last ﬁve years, while the dol-
lar value of trading has increased three-fold. Some
49 per cent of Canadians now hold equities in some
form, twice the level of involvement recorded only
11 years ago (TSE 2000a). At the same time, media cov-
erage of ﬁnancial markets, particularly stock markets,
reﬂects an almost unprecedented level of interest.
Why is this happening, and why now? Explanations
have included the growing market presence of aging
baby boomers investing for retirement, combined
with a de-emphasis on state-sponsored pension plans;
a relative decline in the importance of government
debt in western ﬁnancial markets; and lower interest
rates on savings that cause investors to seek higher
returns elsewhere. All these factors point to the current
level of interest in stock markets as the product of
demographic and cyclical macroeconomic factors. At
the same time, however, some observers note that the
currentsituationhasnovel characteristics.Speciﬁcally,
this surge in equity market activity has been accompa-
nied by rapid developments in information and com-
munications technology. These innovations have made
both access to, and information regarding, markets
cheaper and more convenient, and this may have per-
manently altered the dynamics that drive markets.
As well, increased trading volumes have resulted in
higher revenues for market-providers, raising the
stakes in the trading-services industry. This has fuelled
a sharp expansion of investment in technology and
has also induced new entrants to the ﬁeld. While less
visible than stock market chat rooms, internet IPOS,
or retail on-line trading, developments in, and the
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increasing adoption of, information and communica-
tions technology are profoundly affecting the structure
of equity markets. This article discusses the ways in
which technological innovation, particularly improve-
ments in communications and information technology,
areheighteningcompetitionandcreatingthepotential
for important changes to the structure of equity markets.
Canadian Equity Markets: Deﬁnition
and Structure
Deﬁnition and function of a stock exchange
A stock exchange is an organized market in which a
participant can trade securities in a publicly visible
manner, under recognized guidelines applicable to all
members of the organization. As part of the ﬁnancial
system, exchanges can have an impact on economic
growth through their effects on capital accumulation.
Organized ﬁnancial markets can reduce information
and transactions costs and can help to bring savers
and investors together more efﬁciently.1 Levine (1997)
outlines ﬁve functions performed by ﬁnancial systems
that can affect economic growth: mobilization of sav-
ings, allocation of resources, effect on corporate con-
trol, facilitation of risk management, and ease in the
trading of goods, services, and contracts. It should be
noted that, because of the beneﬁts that fair and efﬁ-
cientlyfunctioningexchanges candeliverto thepublic
and to the economy, they are often considered quasi-
public utilities. Inefﬁciencies in an exchange can affect
the community at large, not just the direct market par-
ticipants. For these reasons, as well as concerns over
investor protection, exchanges have typically operated
in a relatively regulated environment.
Traditionally, exchanges have been governed as non-
proﬁt mutual organizations, often created by dealers
and brokers who decided to share the expense of set-
ting up a trading facility. Given the limited space,
access to the trading ﬂoor was determined through
the sale of “seats” or membership status. Members
were then the intermediaries for all others wishing to
trade on the market, and, in that context, they were
also the primary consumers of the exchange’s trading
services.
Exchanges can be broadly categorized into two types,
each using a different “price-discovery” mechanism.
The ﬁrst type is an auction market, often called an
1.  For a recent study of the link between ﬁnancial systems and growth, see
Leahy et al. (2001). Levine and Zervos (1998) ﬁnd that stock market liquidity
and banking development are positively related to contemporaneous and
future economic growth.
“order-driven”market.Inapureorder-drivenmarket,
all buy and sell orders are directed to a central location,
called an order book, where they interact to create
trades.2 Price discovery—the process through which
market prices are generated—results from the interac-
tion of buy and sell orders.
This structure contrasts with that of a dealer, or “quote-
driven” market, in which dealers announce prices at
which they are willing to buy or sell securities, some-
times only in response to speciﬁc inquiries. In dealer
markets, independent dealers, or market-makers,
compete against each other for investor orders, com-
mitting capital to that activity and acting as principal
in all transactions. Market liquidity and price discovery
are determined through the interaction of the market-
makers’ quotes with orders.
In reality, markets rarely ﬁt neatly into one of these
two stylized descriptions. For example, many auction
market exchanges rely on market-makers, called regis-
tered traders or specialists, to supply some liquidity
and to contribute to a fair and orderly market by
continuously displaying bids and offers. In exchange
for meeting these and other responsibilities, market-
makers typically enjoy such privileges as better access
to information about orders and enhanced opportuni-
ties to trade with incoming orders.
A second modiﬁcation often seen in auction markets
is the presence of an “upstairs market” that facilitates
trading outside the market’s central trading mecha-
nism. An upstairs market is often present in auction
markets because of the difficulty these markets have in
handling large orders: if a large transaction is sent to
the central order book, it can lead to a large, adverse
price movement.To avoid thiseffect, investment dealers
can execute this type of transaction in two ways: ﬁrst,
by trading for their own account (acting as principal
and putting their own capital at risk, as in a dealer
market), or by ﬁnding an offsetting customer order in
the (less-transparent) upstairs market.
The Canadian equity market
The existence of stock exchanges in Canada can be
traced back more than 125 years. The Montreal Stock
Exchange (now known as the Montreal Exchange or
ME) was the ﬁrst to incorporate in 1874, while the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) was founded in 1878.
Other exchanges followed in the early years of the
2.  There are two main types of orders: market and limit. A market order
means that the shares are to be bought or sold immediately at the best current
market price. In contrast, a limit order speciﬁes a price at which the investor
would like to buy or sell a certain number of shares.17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
20th century, but, by 1999, four main stock exchanges
were operating in Canada—the ME, the TSE, the
Alberta Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Vancouver
Stock Exchange (VSE).3
The TSE has gradually established itself as Canada’s
principal market for equity trading; in 1998, its share
of equity trading reached almost 90 per cent. In March
1999, these four main stock exchanges announced an
agreement to restructure the Canadian markets into
areasofspecialization.Theagreementwasimplemented
at the end of 1999 and in early 2000. As a result, the
trading of senior equities was consolidated on the TSE,
derivatives trading was transferred to the ME, and the
ASE and the VSE, after merging to become the Canadian
Venture Exchange (CDNX), specialized in the trading
of junior securities.4
The rationale behind the restructuring was a desire to
strengthen the overall competitiveness of the Canadian
exchanges by reducing fragmentation. At the time,
this was seen as especially critical, given the increasing
globalization of markets and the growing competition
between traditional stock exchanges and new trading
mechanisms. In addition, the restructuring promised
to eliminate some duplication and simplify trading
rules and regulation, thereby contributing to lower
costs for issuers, dealers, and investors. Finally, each
exchange hoped to increase its expertise by concen-
trating its efforts on a speciﬁc segment of the ﬁnancial
market.
The TSE is by far the largest exchange in Canada. At
the end of December 2000, market capitalization on
the exchange was $1,434 billion with 1,421 companies
listed (the average issue size was almost $850 million).
To put this in perspective, in terms of market capitali-
zation of domestic companies, as of December 2000,
the TSE was the eighth-largest equity exchange in the
world, but it was 15 times smaller than the largest
(US$770 billion versus US$11,442 billion in market
capitalization at the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE)).5 The volume of activity on the TSE, like most
other exchanges in the world, has surged in the last
3. Other smaller exchanges were also present: the Winnipeg Stock Exchange,
The Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, and the Toronto Futures Exchange. The
Canadian Dealing Network (CDN) was recognized as a quotation and trade-
reporting system.
4.  Small-sized Quebec companies (approximately 130) continued to be listed
in Montreal, but the CDNX platform is used. In the autumn of 2000, the ME
and the CDNX reached an agreement for the transfer of those companies to the
CDNX, but regulators have still not approved the agreement.
5. For more details, see the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (IFSE)
Web site at www.ﬁbv.com/statm.asp.
few years. In 2000, an average of 131,000 transactions
was made each day, representing an average of
162 million shares for a total value of $3.8 billion.
From 1998 to 2000, the number of transactions grew
by a factor of 2.5, and the dollar value oftrading and
the number of shares traded almost doubled.6
The Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX) ofﬁcially
commenced trading on 29 November 1999. Given its
focus on small and emerging companies, the average
equity market capitalization of the 2,600 ﬁrms listed
on the exchange is relatively low at $5.7 million. Thus,
total market capitalization was roughly $15 billion in
December 2000, only 1 per cent that of the TSE. The
structure of the Canadian equity market is continuing
to evolve, following an agreement in principle between
the CDNX and the TSE, under which the CDNX would
become a wholly owned subsidiary of the TSE. Share-
holders of both exchanges voted in favour of the merger
in May 2001, and regulatory approval was granted in
late July.
The TSE and CDNX operate under a similar market
structure. Both have a modiﬁed electronic auction/
order-driven market.7 The TSE market structure can
be characterized as a modified continuous auction
market because of the role played by two groups to
support the trading process: registered traders and
investment dealers. The role of investment dealers in
the upstairs market is very important to the TSE, and it
has grown over the years. In terms of value of activity,
the share of upstairs trades has increased from 37 per
cent in 1984 to around 53 per cent in 1996, of which
90 per cent were large or block trades (TSE 1997). The
upstairs market is still estimated to account for 50 per
cent or more of the TSE’S trading volume. The growth
of “upstairs trading” can be attributed to many factors,
including the growing importance of institutional
investors since the 1970s, concentration among invest-
ment dealers and institutional investors, regulatory
changes, and technological progress that allows
participating organizations to perform upstairs trad-
ing with small retail trades.
FollowingtherestructuringoftheCanadianexchanges,
the ME became the market for derivative products.
Futures and options contracts on interest rates, indices,
and individual stocks are now being offered by the
6.  The restructuring of the exchanges, in particular the transfer of all senior
equity trading to the TSE, accounts for some of this increase.
7. The TSE was one of the ﬁrst exchanges in the world to introduce computer-
ized trading. It closed its traditional open-outcry trading ﬂoor in 1997, becom-
ing the ﬁrst North American stock exchange to do so.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
ME. As well, at the end of 2000, 128 small companies
were still listed on the exchange, for a total market
capitalization of $1.1 billion.
A new exchange has recently appeared on the Canadian
landscape. On 26 April 2000, Nasdaq Stock Market
Inc. (Nasdaq) and the Government of Quebec
announced that they had reached an agreement to
establish anew exchange: Nasdaq Canada.The arrival
of Nasdaq in Canada will be accomplished in three
phases. In the ﬁrst phase, Nasdaq terminals will be
installed in the ofﬁces of those Quebec dealers who
are members of the U.S. National Association of Secu-
rities Dealers (NASD), allowing them direct access to
the U.S. Nasdaq market. In the second phase, a new
Canadian stock exchange would be created:
Nasdaq Canada. Canadian-based companies could
then be listed in Canada on the new exchange. Finally,
in the third phase, Nasdaq Canada would be linked to
other Nasdaq exchanges to form a global exchange,
allowing trading 24 hours a day. The ﬁrst phase was
launched on 21 November 2000. The second phase,
originally scheduled for early 2001, has been delayed
until mid-2002.
Whilethesearethemainexchangescurrentlyactiveinthe
Canadian market, a new type of marketplace is likely
to emerge in the near future: “the alternative trading
system” (ATS). This has been made possible by advances
in computer technology and telecommunications. In
simple terms, an ATS is a computer system that brings
together orders from buyers and sellers. Furthermore,
order interaction is predetermined and is set by the
system operators, not by relying on a discretionary
process. Many other terms have been used to describe
similar systems: Electronic Communication Networks
(ECNS), Non-Exchange Trading Systems (NETS), or
Proprietary Electronic Trading Systems (PETS).
ATSS can succeed by offering investors enhanced ﬂexi-
bility and reduced trading costs. More precisely, ATSS
have features that can potentially make them attractive
to various participants. They can provide anonymity
to trading parties, since often only the size and price
of an order is displayed (a feature highly valued by
some institutional investors). At the same time, those
systems can provide more transparency than tradi-
tional markets by making their order books com-
pletely public. Furthermore, because they use state-
of-the-art technology, ATSS can execute trades less
expensively and faster than exchanges. In addition,
they can sometimes allow participants to use more
complex order management. For example, investors
can post conditional orders, or they can use reserve or
hidden orders (only part of an order is revealed to the
market). Finally, an ATS can succeed by offering serv-
ices not provided by traditional exchanges, such as
after-hours trading.
In Canada, the role of ATSS, and how to incorporate
them into capital markets, has been debated for more
than 10 years. So far, ATSS have been allowed to oper-
ate in only a restricted fashion; that is, to operate only
as members of an existing exchange and offer trading
in only certain types of instruments. The fear of mar-
ket fragmentation has been the main justiﬁcation for
this policy. (Market fragmentation is discussed further
below.) Instinet was the ﬁrst ﬁrm to try to establish an
ATS in Canada, in 1988. However, Instinet installed ter-
minals in Canada only in 1995 (and only foreign com-
panies were listed). In 1995, another company, Versus
Technologies, also installed terminals on dealers’
desks.
In recent years, the attitude towards such systems has
changed, and most market participants recognize the
beneﬁts that ATSS can provide (TSE 1997). As well, the
growing presence of ATSS in the U.S. market, in the
context of strong economic integration between Canada
and the United States, and the regulatory approach of
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
have probably provided some momentum to move
ahead. In July 1999, and then in a revised version in
July 2000, the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA) presented a proposal to accommodate more
widespread operation of ATSs in Canada.8
Pooling Liquidity: Market
Consolidation, Fragmentation, and
the Role of Technological Change
Market quality and liquidity
Marketplaces, or exchanges, can be thought of as ﬁrms
that compete for order ﬂow on the basis of market
quality. While difﬁcult to deﬁne precisely, market
quality includes such considerations as informational
efﬁciency, volatility, transparency, and liquidity. In a
broad sense, however, one might think of market
quality as describing the explicit and implicit costs
borne by participants in the course of trading securities
(Domowitz and Steil 1999; Schwartz and Weaver
2001).
Attempts to compare markets in terms of quality have
focused on liquidity. A difﬁcult concept in its own
8.  Canadian Securities Administrators is a forum for co-operation among
Canada’s 10 provincial and 3 territorial securities regulatory authorities.19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
right, market liquidity is typically measured along
four dimensions: tightness (the difference between
buy and sell prices, or the bid-ask spread), depth (the
size of transaction that can be absorbed without affect-
ing prices), immediacy (the speed with which orders
are ﬁlled), and resiliency (the ease with which prices
return to “normal,” following a temporary order
imbalance) (BIS 2000).
Network externalities and their
implications for the structure of
equity markets
An important feature of market liquidity is that it
exhibits positive feedback. Put simply, a highly liquid
market is attractive to potential participants, and as
the number of participants increases, liquidity improves,
resulting in a market that is still more attractive to
those not yet participating. And so on. Unfortunately,
this feedback effect also works in reverse: as partici-
pants withdraw from a market, perhaps in favour of
another, liquidity suffers, increasing the likelihood
that others will follow.
The self-fulﬁlling “liquidity effect” described above
can be explained with reference to network externali-
ties. Centralized markets, such as most equity markets,
can be viewed as networks, with each trading partici-
pant acting as a network node (Economides 1993). The
value of a network to each participant increases with
the number of constituent nodes. Network economics
has also been usefully applied to railways, mail systems,
and the telephone. For example, at the time when only
1,000 households in North America had one, the tele-
phone was not particularly useful: the chances that
one could pick up the phone and call any given person
were practically nil. Over time, as more telephones
(i.e., nodes) were added to the network, the beneﬁt to
the next potential customer became ever greater. Like-
wise, the addition of each new participant to a central-
ized market increases the number of potential trading
counterparties for each of those already participating.
Network externalities are useful in explaining the
“first-mover advantage,” which seems to have favoured
incumbent exchanges over time. The fact that market
liquidity already exists in a certain market represents
a competitive advantage. However, from a wider per-
spective, a ﬁrst-mover advantage can be problematic
in that it can sustain a suboptimal equilibrium. While
the formation of a larger network, or a high degree of
uniformity in the public’s use of a specific market
arrangement or technology, may be positive in terms
of efﬁciency, this gain, along with the coordination
problems of moving to new arrangements, can hinder
the introduction of potentially superior innovations.9
Perhaps most important for this discussion of market
structure, network effects imply a tendency towards
consolidation. Along with economies of scale, indus-
tries featuring network externalities clearly favour
size.10 World equity markets, while still somewhat
fragmented, have become increasingly consolidated
over time.
The much-discussed globalization of markets is a
continuation of developments that have seen regional
equity markets gradually giving way to the dominance
of national, and now global, trading centres over the
last two centuries (Angel 1998). Facilitated by reductions
inlanguage,regulatory,andculturalbarriers,ﬁnancial
market consolidation has been driven, to a large degree,
by improvements in transportation and, more recently,
communications technology. While impediments to
interregional and international securities trading
remain, the geographic obstacles that once protected
regional markets are no longer as relevant as they
once were.
In the recent past, regional stock exchanges have closed
in England, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. In addi-
tion, while the United States once featured a stock
exchange in virtually every major commercial city,
there are now only a handful (Angel 1998). Similarly,
as discussed above, Canadian stock exchanges were
recently restructured along speciﬁc product lines to
generate gains from consolidation.
Given greater scope to reap network externalities
through advances in technology, competition among
rival exchanges is often resolved through mergers and
alliances. Network externalities dictate that there is
much to gain from combining isolated pools of liquidity.
That is, mergers can result in greater market quality
and, therefore, in enhanced future competitiveness.
Given these considerations, one would expect a ten-
dencytowardsalliancesamongexchanges(Domowitz
and Steil 1999).
In addition, positive-feedback cycles with respect to
liquidity imply that the successful entrance of a com-
peting market is usually characterized by a relatively
abrupt and rapid movement of trading from one
9.  For instance, it has been argued that the QWERTY keyboard conﬁguration
prevailed over a technically superior competing system (Dvorak) simply
because of such a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
10. For more on the economies of scale and scope and how they contribute to
consolidation in ﬁnancial markets, see Box 1.20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
venue to another, in response to apparently small
advantages, once a critical level of liquidity has been
achieved. These are known as “tipping effects”
(Domowitz and Steil 1999). A classic example is the
competition between the Deutsche Terminboerse
(DTB) derivatives exchange and the London Interna-
tional Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE)
for trading in 10-year Bund futures contracts during
1997–98. In 1997, the DTB was the first non-U.S.
exchange to be granted the right by U.S. authorities to
solicit members based in the United States. Prior to
commencing U.S. trading, the DTB had 35 to 40 per
cent of the world market, with LIFFE dominating the
rest. By spring 1998, the DTB’S market share had
grown to 70 per cent, and by summer it was nearly
100 per cent (Domowitz and Steil 1999).
Forces limiting consolidation
The factors discussed above imply an evolution of
equity market structure towards a degree of consoli-
dation that simply does not, indeed perhaps cannot,
exist. Obviously, signiﬁcant barriers preserve segmen-
tation in global equity markets.11
While deregulation has occurred in recent years,
important regulatory differences between jurisdic-
tions persist, and impediments to international invest-
ment continue. For example, even in the case of
Canada and the United States, whose economies and
capital markets are very closely integrated, Canadian
investors are encouraged to purchase Canadian stocks
by the tax treatment of dividends and by foreign-con-
tent limits for certain types of savings (Beaulieu and
Bellemare 2000).
As well, differences in accounting standards, and
therefore the additional expenses involved in meeting
exchange-listing requirements in a foreign country,
often present a meaningful barrier to mid- and small-
sized companies. Time-zone differences are also a
11. Malkamäki and Topi (1999) present factors that slow the consolidation or
integration of securities markets.
Box 1: Economies of Scale and Scope in the Provision of Trading Services
In a recent study, Hasan and Malkamäki (2000)
examined economies of scale and scope across 38
exchanges over the period from 1989 to 1998. The
authors looked at two functions performed by
exchanges: the matching and processing of trades
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc functions (such as marketplace
regulation and activities related to the listing of
companies).1 By separating the two functions, an
exchange can see where the potential gains might
come from and which activity would beneﬁt most
in terms of efﬁciency if it were combined with that
of another exchange. The authors found that North
American and European exchanges reported much
greater economies of scale than those of other coun-
tries. For North American exchanges, doubling the
1. Theory suggests that simple information (like market orders) is easy to
centralize while more complex information may require more face-to-face
contacts. Activities required for listing procedures and communication
with companies might thus be better handled by national exchanges.
value of trading and the number of listed compa-
nies would boost costs by only 49 per cent. For
European exchanges, total costs would rise by
90 per cent. They found substantial economies of
scale for the largest exchanges. Results for econo-
mies of scope were similar: North American and
European exchanges had more to gain in the multi-
task production (trade processing and the listing of
companies). These results imply that mergers and
alliances between large exchanges (which typically
operate within similar regulatory structures and
may be more committed to spending a higher pro-
portion of resources on human capital and trading
systems) could be quite proﬁtable and could allow
exchanges to become more competitive. However,
they also indicate that alliances between exchanges
that do not focus on trying to beneﬁt from these
economies of scale (e.g., by not consolidating trad-
ing-system software or operations) could be only a
temporary solution (Malkamäki and Topi 1999).21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
signiﬁcant factor segmenting markets, as are language
and cultural differences.
Further limitations to consolidation, even within
regional markets, stem from the fact that participants
do not have homogeneous trading needs. Certain
markets may offer features that are attractive to some
investors but not to others. “Clientele effects,” such as
these, can preserve distinct marketplaces. For instance,
institutional traders often desire anonymity and
opaqueness, while retail traders typically favour
systems with a high level of transparency. Some trad-
ers prize immediacy, which dealer markets may be
relatively better equipped to provide than order-
driven markets.
The role of technical innovation
Improvements in technology have facilitated the long-
term trend of equity market consolidation, within
regions, nations, and now on a global scale. Above all,
ﬁnancial markets depend on information and on the
efficientandtimelycommunicationofthatinformation.
Improvements in communications technology have
effectively decreased the geographical barriers that
segment markets. As further consolidation of equity
markets became feasible through changes in technology,
combined with deregulation and improved information
flow, network effects and economies of scale have
virtually ensured that equity markets would become
more integrated.
Improvements in technology
have facilitated the long-term trend
of equity market consolidation,
within regions, nations, and now
on a global scale.
But in addition to allowing traditional exchanges to
compete in each other’s markets, recent advances in
information technology have also given rise to new
competitors. Electronic systems, such as ATSS, can be
cheaper to develop and operate than traditional
exchanges. Therefore, barriers to entry have fallen,
and the market has become more contestable. Where
regulation allows, automated auctions are beginning
to challenge the traditional exchanges, amounting to a
technology-driven reversal of the long-standing trend
towards market consolidation.
Some observers argue that this reversal in direction,
towards market fragmentation rather than consolida-
tion, will be temporary, to the extent that it materializes.
According to this analysis, following a transitional
stage featuring multiple liquidity pools, network
externalities might be expected to be reasserted and
dominate the longer-run evolution of the global market
structure (Madhavan 2000).
Impact of Globalization,




Globalization is the manifestation of developments
that have increased the linkages among countries and
their ﬁnancial markets. In terms of the framework
discussed in the previous section, globalization
describes the reduction in the long-standing barriers
to consolidation of ﬁnancial markets. To the extent
that they are present, economies of scale and scope
also contribute to the consolidation of exchanges
through mergers or alliances.
From the perspective of traditional Canadian equity
markets, globalization can present a challenge. As
parts of a relatively small open economy, Canada’s
markets compete against much larger and more liquid
foreign markets, particularly in the United States. This
competition manifests itself most clearly in the deci-
sion of Canadian ﬁrms to list on U.S. exchanges, either
in addition to, or instead of, Canadian venues. The
success of any exchange depends critically on its abil-
ity to attract and keep listings—failure to do so will
result in it becoming marginalized over time.
Studies have indicated that a signiﬁcant number of
Canadian ﬁrms are deciding to list on U.S. exchanges
(Chart 1). This is also the case for ﬁrms from other
countries, particularly European ﬁrms. At the same
time, the TSE’S share of the total value of trading in
Canadian cross-listed securities has recently fallen
(Chart 2). (For more on cross-listing, as well as a dis-
cussion of the motivations of Canadian ﬁrms in decid-
ing to list on foreign exchanges, see Box 2.)
While it is apparent that competitive pressures have
been increasing, the question of whether or not Cana-
dian exchanges can continue to be competitive is one22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
of relative market quality. As we have seen, market
quality is difﬁcult to quantify, although some research
has sought to do so with respect to trading costs. For
example, Elkins/McSherry Co., Inc. calculated equity-
trading costs in 42 countries between September 1996
Chart 1
Proportion of Interlisted Shares on the TSE:
1980–2001*
Number of Canadian-based issues interlisted on U.S. exchanges/number of
companies listed on the TSE
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Value of Trading in Canadian-Based Interlisted
Shares: 1980–2001*
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and December 1998.12 Both explicit (commissions)
and implicit (estimated market impact) costs were
measured. For the full sample, explicit trading costs
averaged 46 basis points. (A basis point is one one-
hundredth of a percentage point.) Implicit costs
amounted to 25 basis points on average. This suggests
that total costs of trading can signiﬁcantly affect the
net return of a portfolio. Total costs varied signiﬁ-
cantly between countries and declined over time for
most economic regions.
While it is apparent that competitive
pressures have been increasing,
the question of whether or not
Canadian exchanges can continue
to be competitive is one of
relative market quality.
Several studies have compared implicit and explicit
trading costs on the TSE and NYSE, for various types
of trades, and under varying conditions, but these
investigations have failed to reach a unanimous ver-
dict with respect to overall costs.13 Smith et al. (2000a)
examined the trading of Canadian ﬁrms on the NYSE
and TSE (67 companies). One of their conclusions was
that price-impact costs (i.e., an implicit trading cost)
for cross-listed securities were lower on the TSE, and
that this result held after controlling for the larger
average size of trades on the NYSE, as well as for dif-
ferences in price volatility and ﬁrm size. Interestingly,
they found that although market quality was the
primary determinant of the location of trading activ-
ity, 23 per cent of the TSE trades and 34 per cent of the
NYSE trades could have been executed on the other
exchange at a better price. That result suggests that
factors other than cost could explain where a trade is
actually executed. They suggest that clientele effects
could be part of the answer. Investors, at least in part,
might trade in their home market for reasons of con-
venience and familiarity.
12.   Data from 135 institutional investors involved in more than 600,000
trades. See Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2000).
13.   For more information, see TSE (2000b), Smith et al. (2000a), Domowitz,
Glen, and Madhavan (2000), Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1998), and Foerster and
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Box 2: Cross-listing
Listingonforeignexchangescanbringcompaniesa
number of beneﬁts.1The most obvious is the ability
to raise capital more cheaply, as well as to tap into a
broader source of capital (Pagano, Röell, and Zech-
ner 2000). Cross-listing can help to reduce barriers
(regulation, transaction costs, or informational) to
foreign investors, reducing market segmentation
and leading to an increase in investor base and
investor recognition. A company might see beneﬁts
to cross-listing on an exchange where there are more
analysts focused on a specific industry, or where the
market is more liquid, or where there are higher
standards with respect to disclosure or corporate
governance. Firms can also take advantage of relative
mispricing in the domestic versus the foreign market.2
The attractiveness of the U.S. markets has been
such that many exchanges around the world, not
just Canadian exchanges, are facing similar chal-
lenges. Over the years, U.S. exchanges have been
signiﬁcantly increasing their listings of foreign
companies. On the NYSE, the number of foreign
listings increased very slowly from 1956 to the mid-
1980s, from 25 to about 50 listings. Since then, the
number of foreign listings has exploded, especially
in the 1990s, reaching about 430 at the end of 2000.
Foreign listings now account for about 10 per cent
of total trading volume on the NYSE.3
Two recent studies (Pagano, Röell, and Zechner
2000; and Pagano et al. 2000) looked at the cross-
listing phenomenon from 1986 to 1997, with a spe-
cial focus on European and U.S. exchanges. The
authors found that the number of European compa-
niescross-listingtheirsharesincreasedmarkedly and
that it was mainly to the beneﬁt of U.S. exchanges.
For instance, over the 11-year period studied in their
ﬁrst paper, the number of European companies list-
ing on U.S. exchanges increased to 206 from only 52,
while cross-listings on other European exchanges
increased modestly from 147 to 180. In contrast, the
number of U.S. companies listing on European
1.  See Karolyi (1998) for a survey of the literature on cross-listing.
2. These reasons are to a large extent similar to the responses obtained in
a National Financial Communications and Scotia Capital Markets (1998)
survey of 45 Canadian companies that were cross-listed on U.S.
exchanges. It was found that the companies accessed the U.S. market
with speciﬁc beneﬁts in mind: greater access to capital, greater liquidity
for their securities, increased institutional investment, as well as analyst
coverage.
3.  For more, see market data provided by the NYSE Web site:
www.nyse.com/marketinfo/marketinfo.html.
exchanges declined from 284 to 184.4A similar pat-
tern was seen for ﬁrms of other countries: U.S.
exchanges captured an increasing share of foreign
listings over the period. In their second paper
(Pagano et al. 2000), the authors also looked at the
cross-listing decision of European companies by
comparing the receiving exchanges with the origi-
nating exchange. They concluded that European
companies were more likely to cross-list in more liq-
uid and larger markets, on exchanges where many
companies from their industry were already
present, and in countries with better investor pro-
tection and with more efﬁcient courts and bureau-
cratic infrastructure.
With regard to the Canadian experience, it should
be noted that cross-listing is not a new phenome-
non. In fact, the ﬁrst foreign listing on the NYSEwas
a Canadian company in 1872. Figures show that
Canadian companies have increasingly sought to
list on foreign exchanges. The number of Canadian
companies trading on U.S. exchanges currently
stands at around 200, compared with only 82 com-
panies in 1980.5 Furthermore, many of these
Canadian companies are not listed on a Canadian
exchange. In November 2000, 42 Canadian compa-
nieswerelistedonNasdaq without being listed on a
Canadian exchange.
To evaluate how cross-listing affects Canadian stock
exchanges, one must also consider their ability to
maintain their market share of trading in a security,
once it is cross-listed on a foreign exchange. Over the
last few years, the Canadian exchanges’ share of
the value of trading activity in Canadian-based
cross-listed securities has decreased. In 1997, this
share was almost 65 per cent, but in the ﬁrst ﬁve
months of 2001, it had fallen to 52 per cent. The
TSE’S share of the volume of shares traded, how-
ever, has not fallen from the 57 per cent recorded in
1997. Moreover,it hasbeen observed thatthe decline
in the TSE’S market share of value of trading coin-
cides with a period of exceptional growth in U.S.
equity markets, a period during which a small
number of relatively high-proﬁle Canadian ﬁrms
were receiving a great deal of attention from U.S.
investors.
4.  That paper also looked in detail into the characteristics and the behav-
iour of European companies that cross-list. They found striking differ-
ences between ﬁrms that cross-listed on other European exchanges and
those that cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.
5.  In contrast, the number of foreign companies listing in Canada has
declined from 65 in 1980, to approximately 25 currently.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
It seems clear that there will always be room for a
Canadian equity market. Mid-to-small-sized Canadian
ﬁrms simply do not attract the interest of foreign
investors, just as the stocks of smaller foreign companies
are relatively unknown in Canada. For those compa-
nies, the informational advantage of national exchanges
and the different national market participants (inter-
mediaries as well as investors) will remain important.
However, concern on the part of Canadian equity
market providers stems from the fear that the TSE
might see its biggest successes, the trading in its most
liquid stocks, migrate to foreign venues, potentially
reducing the TSE to the de facto role of “junior” equity
market on an international stage. In turn, losing the
revenues generated by listing, trading in, and selling
market data with respect to these most liquid issues
would affect the proﬁtability of an exchange, which
could further weaken the competitive position. Lower
revenues could make it more difﬁcult to continue to
invest in the exchange infrastructure in order to
remain competitive, increasing the necessity for the
exchange to form an alliance or to merge.
On the other hand, as impediments to international
securities trading are reduced over time, foreign
investors interested in the shares of Canadian ﬁrms
will be more likely to trade on the market they con-
sider to be superior, regardless of location. If the TSE
offers a market for Canadian securities that is compet-
itive in terms of quality, efficiency, and integrity, it
might be expected to benefit as these barriers diminish.
Competition from ATSs
ATSS have had the most success in the United States,
where they became signiﬁcant in the mid-1990s, by
taking advantage of certain regulatory and technolog-
ical changes.14 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) estimates that ATSS represent 30 per cent
of trading in Nasdaq shares and 3 per cent of NYSE-
listed listed shares (SEC 2000b). Island, an ATS special-
izing in retail trades, which has been particularly
successful, in January 2001 accounted for 10.9 per
cent of the value of trading on the Nasdaq. At the
same time, Instinet, which has specialized in inter-
dealer trading and the institutional market, repre-
sented 14.4 per cent of Nasdaq trading value.15 In
Europe, on the other hand, ATSS have yet to present a
serious challenge to established traditional exchanges
(FESCO 2000; FSA 2000).
14.  See McAndrews and Stefanadis (2000) for an overview of the emergence
of ATSs in the U.S. market.
15.  Nasdaq monthly market data can be found at www.marketdata.Nas-
daq.com/mr_outline.asp.
While ATSS apparently represent a competitive chal-
lenge to what might be seen as the established order
in world equity markets, it is interesting to note that
many of the large, international broker-dealers own
shares of these emerging systems. At the same time,
they continue to hold memberships, and have more
general interests, in the exchanges that ATSS hope to
compete against. This would allow these ﬁrms to
diversify their risks at this time of rapid evolution.
As described earlier, ATSS have yet to emerge as a com-
petitive force in Canada. While the institution of a
more permissive set of rules seems imminent, ATSS are
not currently allowed to operate in Canada except as
members of an established exchange. This stems from
concerns over the potential fragmentation of liquidity.
There are, however, factors in the Canadian market
that might inﬂuence the proliferation of ATSS differ-
ently than in the United States.
In explaining the success of
marketplaces, it is useful to return to
the issue of market quality— what do
these new markets have to offer, what
advantages do they bring?
In explaining the success of marketplaces, it is useful
to return to the issue of market quality—what do
these new markets have to offer, what advantages do
they bring? In this case, ATSs such as Island offer an
open-order-book trading environment, which is not
available on the Nasdaq, a dealer market. This is
pointed to as a significant factor in explaining the
relative success of ATSS in some U.S. dealer markets
(e.g., Nasdaq), as opposed to markets that are already
characterized by order-book price discovery, such as
Canada’s, most markets in Europe, and the NYSE (FSA
2000). One area where ATSS could offer a feature cur-
rently lacking in the Canadian market would be after-
hours trading.
There are also regulatory factors that might have facil-
itated the growth of ATSs in U.S. Nasdaqsecurities. For
instance, while in some U.S. exchanges, such as the
NYSE, member ﬁrms were, until recently, prevented
from trading in listed securities off the exchange, the
Nasdaq market imposed no such restrictions on its
participants (Sirri 2000). Aside from regulating25 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
exchange members, it is also important to note that
SEC regulation has also supported competition from
these new entrants: While they perform services that
are essentially identical to those of traditional stock
exchanges, ATSS have been allowed to classify them-
selves as “broker-dealers” for the purposes of regula-
tion, a designation that carries a signiﬁcantly smaller
regulatory burden than the term “exchange.”
The proliferation of ATSS in the United States has
corresponded to the rapid expansion in trading and
market activity. To the extent that future growth might
be curtailed, one might expect a relatively slower
rate of expansion in the exchange-services industry,
including the entry of new competitors such as ATSS
(Benhamou and Serval 2000).
How are exchanges reacting?
At a fundamental level, the potential for any significant
change to the organization and structure of Canadian
equity markets represents a competitive challenge to
the Canadian stock exchanges for the central and
primary role that they currently hold. It is therefore
not surprising that these institutions have been taking
measures to improve market quality in response to,
and in anticipation of, these challenges.
Given the self-reinforcing nature of market liquidity,
the established Canadian stock markets continue to
enjoy a considerable advantage over any potential
competitors. If the beneﬁts in terms of cost, or other
advantages, are perceived to be substantial, however,
trading can migrate to other venues quite abruptly, as
with the “tipping effects” described previously.
In attempting to address competition and improve
market quality, the primary strategy of the traditional
Canadian equity markets has been one of maximizing
liquidity and improving efﬁciency through consolida-
tion. As described earlier, Canadian stock exchanges
have undertaken signiﬁcant restructuring, the stated
objectives of which were to concentrate liquidity, elim-
inate redundancy, and improve efﬁciency by consoli-
dating trading in each of three securities classes at
only one location. The recent merger agreement of
the TSE and CDNX can be seen as a straightforward
continuation of this strategy.
For those exchanges that conduct their markets on an
electronic platform, further investment in computer
and back-ofﬁce systems can be a useful strategy. By
providing enhanced services, additional capacity,
improved reliability, or by reducing their operating
costs, exchanges can attempt to improve market qual-
ity. The CDNX is expected to beneﬁt from the adoption
of the TSE’s trading platform once the merger between
the two exchanges is complete.
One of the advantages that competitors, particularly
ATSS, can offer potential participants is a new option or
feature that is not available on the incumbent market.
Exchanges have tried to develop some of these fea-
tures either as part of, or in conjunction with, their pri-
mary market. Along these lines, the TSE is working
with ITG Canada to launch a periodic call auction
market for institutional investors, called POSIT. The
TSE is also working with Ashton Technology Group to
introduce an anonymous system that will match
trades at the beginning of the day using the volume-
weighted average price (VWAP).
In a stated bid to increase trading volumes in shares
cross-listed with the NYSE, the TSE instituted decimal-
ization in April 1996, and in January 2001 it com-
menced trading in penny increments for stocks with
share prices greater than $5.16
Exchanges can facilitate competitive changes by
demutualizing their ownership structure.17 Mutual
ownership by participating broker-dealers can be
associated with problems in incentives and governance.
Essentially, when the owners of an exchange are also
some of its primary participants, changes to improve
marketqualitymightbeblockedifthosechangesconflict
with the broader interests of some of the members.
Through demutualization, an exchange may be better
able to focus objectively on improving the market. In
addition, if ownership is made public, or at least more
open, it is easier to raise the capital necessary for
investments in projects to improve market quality,
such as system upgrades, or providing new exchange
features to participants. The TSE demutualized and
became a for-proﬁt entity in April 2000; its shares are
not traded publicly at this time.
Perhaps the most striking response to competition,
and one that is apparently being considered by almost
all of the world’s stock exchanges, is that of an
alliance or merger with one or more competitors
(Domowitz and Steil 1999). As discussed earlier, net-
work economics tells us that there are tremendous
potential beneﬁts in terms of market quality to be
derived from pooling the liquidity of competing
markets. In this context, the TSE has been pursuing
16. Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1998), Opdyke (2001), and Opdyke and Zuckerman
(2001) discuss the impact of decimalization on transaction costs, liquidity, and
trading activity.
17.   For more information on the demutualization of stock exchanges, see
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discussions related to the proposed Global Equity
Market (GEM), an alliance that would provide direct
linkages with the NYSE, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the
Hong Kong Exchange, Euronext, and others, repre-
senting in total some 60 per cent of world market
capitalization.18
Regulatory Issues in Response to
Globalization and Innovation
As the pace of change has accelerated and as globalized
markets appear increasingly ready to ﬂee what they
perceive as overregulated or poorly regulated jurisdic-
tions, the regulation of securities markets has become
more difﬁcult. International co-operation among regu-
lators is becoming increasingly important, as globali-
zation and the growth in automated trading systems
blur the boundaries separating one jurisdiction from
another (Blume 2000). In this context, some regulators
are de-emphasizing approaches and policies that are
prescriptive with respect to market structures and
market mechanisms and are focusing instead on creat-
ing a regulatory environment, where, within certain
limits, structures are allowed to evolve according to
the dictates of free market interactions (SEC 2000a;
CSA 1999).
Regulators wish to promote innovation and competi-
tion in securities markets. At the same time, however,
despite the potential beneﬁts in terms of innovation
and efficiency, heightened competition among markets
(as described in the previous section) may also repre-
sent a problem from the public’s perspective, as well
as to the more parochial interests of traditional market
providers. Speciﬁcally, Canadian regulators, among
others, have sought to address concerns relating to
market fragmentation, where securities trading takes
place in multiple markets and there is no opportunity
for orders to interact.
Network economics tells us that a decline in market
participation can have a disproportionately large and
negative impact on market quality. While network
effects also imply that any fragmentation should be
transitional in nature, and that consolidative forces
should reassert themselves in the long run, given the
importance of market quality as a public good, caution
on the part of policy-makers seems warranted. Regu-
lators worry that fragmented markets and fragmented
18.   As a ﬁrst step towards the creation of the global exchange alliance, the
TSE and the NYSE announced in May that the order books of both exchanges
would be linked in 2002, allowing investors to see the orders available in both
markets.
price information leave participants with no assurance
that the price at which they trade represents the best
price available. Fragmentation may also be of concern
with respect to ﬁnancial stability, since illiquid mar-
kets may be less resilient and robust during periods of
extreme volatility in ﬁnancial markets (CGFS 2001).
Market fragmentation
Fragmentation is by no means a new phenomenon,
although the recent gathering of competitive forces in
equity markets has certainly brought it to the forefront
in the minds of many regulators.
Here, we discuss three main sources of liquidity frag-
mentation, both potential and realized, in Canadian
equity markets.
First, and most pervasive is “internal” fragmentation,
which occurs when participants in the centralized
market conduct trades “off exchange,” bypassing the
market’s order-matching function. Upstairs trading,
while useful, and perhaps necessary for reducing the
market-impact costs of large “block” trades, represents
internal fragmentation and may account for 50 per cent
or more of the trading volume on the TSE (TSE 1997;
Smith et al. 2000b).
Internalization of order ﬂow is a form of internal frag-
mentation that occurs when a participating broker-
dealer ﬁlls a customer order on its own, at, or slightly
better than, the best current market price (as regula-
tion often requires), instead of passing it on to the
exchange’s order book. When a stock is actively traded,
a broker-dealer may receive opposing retail orders
nearly simultaneously. By essentially crossing these
orders, it earns a commission from both parties and
can keep the spread between the bid and ask prices. In
so doing, it acts as a dealer, using the exchange’s quotes
passively to set the trade price. In the United States,
this practice has proven so profitable that many brokers
have entered into arrangements (termed “payment for
order ﬂow”) under which they receive compensation
in exchange for routing customer orders to a particu-
lar market-maker.
From the perspective of the exchange, internalization
and payment for order ﬂow fragment liquidity and
reduce the incentives for vigorous price competition
(SEC 2000a). Although the precise extent to which
internalization is present in Canadian equity markets
is not known, TSE rules allowing this practice were
criticized for encouraging dealers to trade “off-
exchange” (TSE 1997). In 1998, the TSE adopted new
rulesgoverningorderexposureandcustomer-principal
trading in an attempt to address the problem.27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
Trade of cross-listed Canadian securities on interna-
tional markets can also be seen as fragmentation from
the vantage point of Canadian markets, although it
may represent market consolidation from a global
perspective. As previously discussed, international
competition for trading in the most liquid Canadian
stocks is a signiﬁcant challenge to liquidity on the TSE.
The ﬁnal type of fragmentation is “external”—that
associated with potential competition from ATSS.
While ATSS may be expected on the whole to have a
positive impact on market liquidity, through enhanced
efﬁciency or through the introduction of innovative
market structures that facilitate networks, it has
been recognized that their immediate effects may
be fragmenting.
Addressing fragmentation
While regulators would like to foster innovation
through competition, they also wish to avoid the
negative effects associated with fragmentation. Of the
three forms identiﬁed above, however, only external
fragmentation has seemed to lend itself to an effective
and straightforward regulatory response. In Canada,
internal fragmentation has been seen as the byproduct
of a market’s internal procedures and membership
rules, with respect to which regulators have tradition-
ally been reluctant to apply prescriptive measures.19
Moreover, mechanisms such as upstairs trading seem
to contribute to the quality of markets by reducing the
market-impact costs of large trades, so that, in this
case, fragmentation might be appropriate.
It is likewise unclear what a national regulator can,
or should, do in the face of fragmentation stemming
from competition from international markets—they
have no authority to impose integration, as may be
done with respect to fragmented domestic markets.
Furthermore, Canadian ﬁrms decide to list on foreign
exchanges for a variety of very good reasons, as dis-
cussed in Box 2, and preventing them from doing so
would not seem to be beneﬁcial, even if it were possi-
ble. Listing decisions are appropriately based on con-
siderations of market liquidity and market quality.
External fragmentation, essentially the potential for
division of liquidity because of new entrants in the
domestic market, has been addressed by regulators,
such as the CSA.
19.   For a discussion of internal fragmentation in U.S. equity markets and
some suggested regulatory measures, see SEC (2000a).
Canadian Securities Administrators
Proposal for ATSs
In July 1999, the CSA published a document proposing
a regulatory framework within which traditional mar-
kets and new markets could operate in Canada. After
receiving comments on the original proposal, the CSA
published a new proposal in July 2000.20 At publica-
tion, no time line had yet been put forward for its
implementation. Moreover, following consultation
with stakeholders, the ﬁnal framework may differ
from the July 2000 proposal.
The primary goal of the proposal is to design a frame-
work that allows competition and yet minimizes the
risk of fragmentation. To achieve that objective, the
proposal deﬁnes a new entity, the marketplace, which
can be either an exchange (such as the TSE or CDNX)
or an ATS. Under certain conditions, an ATS would be
required to register as an exchange, which implies a
somewhat greater regulatory burden. The proposal
also sets out a number of trading rules, which will
apply to all marketplaces, ensuring that ATSS will
follow trade practices as currently applied by exchanges
and covering such issues as short selling, front running
and insider trading, best execution, manipulation and
fraud, principal trading, and trading hours. Following
the release of the ATS proposal, the TSE and the Invest-
ment Dealers Association of Canada proposed the
creation of a stand-alone market regulator. TSE Regu-
lation Services (TSE RS) and CDNX are attempting to
harmonize their market integrity rules and, in April
2001, released for comment the proposed Universal
Market Integrity Rules, which they have suggested
should be applied to the trading of securities on all
exchanges and ATSS (CSA 2001).
To address the potential for fragmentation within this
new, expanded framework, the proposal requires all
marketplaces to share order information with a cen-
tralized data consolidator, who will then supply that
information to the public at large (the identity of the
marketplace would be made public but not the name
of the buyer or seller). Furthermore, a marketplace
must provide all other marketplaces with access to its
orders. Upon receipt of an order, the marketplace can
use its own trading rules, and it can charge fees for the
execution of the incoming orders from another mar-
ketplace. But that fee cannot be set in such a way that
it would effectively create barriers. Finally, the pro-
posal requires participants to provide the marketplace
20.   In the July 2000 proposal, the CSA separated the equity and the ﬁxed-
income markets for purposes of market consolidation and market regulation.28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2001
with information on orders (price and size) received
from customers. Block orders of $100,000 or more are
exempted, and thus upstairs markets could continue
to operate.21
The proposal calls for ATSS to contract with an
approved self-regulatory organization to provide
market regulation. While in many respects practical,
this has raised concerns, stemming from the fact that,
at this time, the only organizations capable of provid-
ing such oversight are the exchanges (CSA 1999). The
potential for conﬂict of interest on this count has been
made even more clear by the recent reorganization of
the TSE as a for-proﬁt entity. The extent to which for-
proﬁt exchanges should continue to operate as self-
regulatory organizations is a topic that is being
debated in many countries (IOSCO2000).InApril 2000,
the TSE announced the creation of TSE Regulation Serv-
ices in order to separate the market regulation function
from its for-profit business activities.
Conclusion
As ﬁnancial markets become more global in nature,
factors that have traditionally segmented regional and
national equity markets are diminishing, and markets
21. This rule is similar to the Order-Handling Rule and the Mandatory Quote
Rule in the United States. According to many observers, the introduction of
these rules in 1996–97 supported the growth of ATSs.
are competing more and more on the basis of market
quality, of which liquidity is an important component.
Network economics implies that, in the absence of sig-
niﬁcant barriers, markets will tend towards consolida-
tion, driven by self-reinforcing “liquidity effects.”
Improvements in communications and information
technologyareheighteningcompetitionamongequity
market providers: (i) by enhancing the capabilities of
established stock exchanges to compete in each
other’s traditional markets; and (ii) by reducing barri-
ers to entry, allowing new competitors to emerge in
the form of “alternative trading systems” or ATSS.
Whiletheﬁrstfactorfacilitatestheobservedlong-term
trend of equity market consolidation, the second
implies a potential for market fragmentation.
The established Canadian stock exchanges have
reacted, and are reacting, to this increasingly competi-
tive environment by demutualizing, introducing deci-
malization, consolidating operations and trading
along lines of specialization, and attempting to offer
innovative and improved services.
While competition and innovation are seen as positive
for the development of Canadian markets, securities
regulators worry about the potentially negative effects
of fragmentation. The Canadian Securities Adminis-
trators have released a proposal which, if imple-
mented, would allow ATSS to operate in Canada,
independent of the established stock exchanges.
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